Test******************************************************************************* Name: Nick Jenny OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesIf played, the players will not regret these strategies. TwoAEq1: No Promo, No Promo TwoAEq2: Promotion, Promotion TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 129.32.177.170 Remote User: Date: 11/02/2009 Time: 13:31 ******************************************************************************* Name: William Otto OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: .5 OneDQ: .5 OneE: Yesyes, because they way we set up the problem, we make sure that the probabilities are such that each player is indifferent about which choice is made. This indifference towards an outcome is the definition of a Nash equilibrium. TwoAEq1: TwoAEq2: TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 129.32.168.236 Remote User: Date: 11/02/2009 Time: 16:27 ******************************************************************************* Name: ajb key OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 0.50 OneDQ: 0.75 OneE: YesNeither player would regret the probabilities they chose TwoAEq1: No P, No P TwoAEq2: Pro, Pro TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 68.81.199.100 Remote User: Date: 11/02/2009 Time: 17:46 ******************************************************************************* Name: Jessica Weinstein OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: .5 OneDQ: .75 OneE: YesWhen Lex and Thea both play mixed strategies, they are both indifferent between their mixed strategies and their pure strategies. So, they wouldn't favor one over the others and regret their decision. TwoAEq1: (No Promo, No Promo) TwoAEq2: (Promotion, Promotion) TwoBMig: .2 TwoBMon: .75 B1: Submit Remote Name: 71.255.96.110 Remote User: Date: 11/02/2009 Time: 18:34 ******************************************************************************* Name: Luv Sodha OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesBecause when the two players play the mixed strategy, both of them get the maximum value from the game. None of them has any regrets. TwoAEq1: No Promotion, No Promotion TwoAEq2: Promotion, Promotion TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 155.247.166.35 Remote User: Date: 11/03/2009 Time: 09:54 ******************************************************************************* Name: Thomas Coyle OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 0.5 OneDQ: .5 OneE: Nothe probabilities do not create indifference in choice for the other player. TwoAEq1: TwoAEq2: TwoBMig: 3/4 TwoBMon: 1/5 B1: Submit Remote Name: 76.99.33.49 Remote User: Date: 11/03/2009 Time: 11:12 ******************************************************************************* Name: Michael Cross OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesWhen they play the mixed strategies, neither player will regret playing that strategy. TwoAEq1: TwoAEq2: TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 155.247.134.212 Remote User: Date: 11/03/2009 Time: 20:09 ******************************************************************************* Name: Eric Stahler OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesBecause when they play these mixed strategies they don't regret either outcome TwoAEq1: TwoAEq2: TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 155.247.134.212 Remote User: Date: 11/03/2009 Time: 20:13 ******************************************************************************* Name: Matt Thachet OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1//4 OneDQ: 1/2 OneE: YesThe players cannot improve their payoff by changing their strategy. TwoAEq1: No Promotion, No Promotion TwoAEq2: Promotion, Promotion TwoBMig: 3/4 TwoBMon: 1/5 B1: Submit Remote Name: 129.32.169.174 Remote User: Date: 11/03/2009 Time: 20:26 ******************************************************************************* Name: Anthony Pody OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesThey would not regret their decision because the value of the game becomes the same for whatever pure strategy they play. TwoAEq1: Promo, Promo TwoAEq2: No Promo, No Promo TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 72.13.137.79 Remote User: Date: 11/03/2009 Time: 23:43 ******************************************************************************* Name: Chris Kraeher OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesOnly this Nash equilibrium exists but every finite game must have a Nash equilibrium. TwoAEq1: (No promo, No Promo) TwoAEq2: (Promotion, Promotion) TwoBMig: 1/3 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 129.32.172.34 Remote User: Date: 11/04/2009 Time: 00:29 ******************************************************************************* Name: Marisa Steinberg OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesBecause every pure strategy that could be played has the same expected value, so the player is indifferent between playing either one. Because they are indifferent between playing either one they will have no incentive to change when playing any strategy. TwoAEq1: No Promo, No Promo TwoAEq2: Promo, Promo TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 129.32.181.95 Remote User: Date: 11/04/2009 Time: 01:41 ******************************************************************************* Name: Eric Reuter OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: .5 OneDQ: .75 OneE: YesThis is where they get maximum benefit from the game TwoAEq1: TwoAEq2: TwoBMig: 25% TwoBMon: 80% B1: Submit Remote Name: 129.32.59.199 Remote User: Date: 11/04/2009 Time: 08:09 ******************************************************************************* Name: Meghan Hackney OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesYou play a mixed strategy so that your opponent will be indifferent between playing their two options. If you are indifferent, then you will not regret your deicsion afterwards, so it is a Nash equillibrium. TwoAEq1: TwoAEq2: TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 129.32.171.249 Remote User: Date: 11/04/2009 Time: 09:31 ******************************************************************************* Name: Ziv Rottman OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesNeither player will regret being there TwoAEq1: No Promotion and No Promotion TwoAEq2: Promotion and Promotion TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 155.247.134.212 Remote User: Date: 11/04/2009 Time: 10:00 ******************************************************************************* Name: Hyun W. Park OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 3/4 OneDQ: 1/3 OneE: Yesit's the best response TwoAEq1: (no promo, no promo) TwoAEq2: (promo, promo) TwoBMig: (P, 1/5) TwoBMon: (P, 3/4) B1: Submit Remote Name: 174.141.141.245 Remote User: Date: 11/04/2009 Time: 12:23 ******************************************************************************* Name: Nina Estrina OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: Yes, TwoAEq1: (No Promo, No Promo) TwoAEq2: (Promo, Promo) TwoBMig: 3/4 TwoBMon: 1/2 B1: Submit Remote Name: 71.185.166.106 Remote User: Date: 11/04/2009 Time: 23:42 ******************************************************************************* Name: OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: OneDQ: OneE: Yes, TwoAEq1: TwoAEq2: TwoBMig: TwoBMon: B1: Submit Remote Name: 195.29.214.243 Remote User: Date: 02/24/2010 Time: 08:40 ******************************************************************************* Name: (I'm not actually in your class) OneA: No OneB: No OneC: No OneDP: 1/2 OneDQ: 3/4 OneE: YesBoth players are indifferent TwoAEq1: (No Promo, No Promo) TwoAEq2: (Promotion, Promotion) TwoBMig: 1/5 TwoBMon: 3/4 B1: Submit Remote Name: 205.173.168.1 Remote User: Date: 05/28/2010 Time: 13:57